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Guilt and Remembrance: On the Theologization 
of History in the Ancient Near East 
For Friedrich H. Tenbruck 5 
History can be de f ined as the fusion of action and memory . 
It comes into being with the format ion of s t ructured spheres 
for action, on the o n e hand , and the crystallization of 
memorab le significance and significant events which mus t be 
obligatorily memorial ized, on the o the r - and the subsequen t 
fixation of such meanings in memory. History alters its 
s t ructure in accordance with two pr ime categories of change : 
that to which the spheres for possible action and lat i tude of 
choice are subject, and that to which the forms a n d funct ions , 
institutions and organs of memory are subject. Consequent ly, 
history is no t simply written differently d e p e n d i n g o n the 
varying socio-cultural f rameworks of action and r e m e m b r a n c e 
- it is also differentially exper ienced and indeed differently 
" m a d e " in accordance with those frameworks. 
T h e quest ion recently raised by Tenbruck regard ing "history 
of society or world his tory '" involves both sides of this 
syndrome: the "wor ld" seen as an a rena for act ion and 
"society" as the bearer of memory, linking u p with and 
guid ing such action. In the present paper , I in tend to 
demons t ra te that the interlinkages in foreign policy in the 
political universe which began to crystallize in the Bronze Age 
- the genesis of the "anc ien t wor ld" and the " e c u m e n i c 
age" 2 - e n g e n d e r e d a structural change no t only in the 
spheres of action, but also in memory itself. T h a t structural 
change was b rough t abou t in the specific f o r m of memory 
b o u n d u p with the obligation to a d h e r e to long-term pacts 
and alliances and the validity of b ind ing treaties and laws. T h e 
ties to which h u m a n beings became subject, both internally 
and externally, in the wake of the format ion of organized state 
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polities laid claim to the future and, together with the 
incipient sphere of action called "world," also created that 
socially constructed sphere of time in which remembered 
history takes place. 
The time was ripe 20 years ago to counter the widespread 
cliche that peoples lacking a written language had no 
historical consciousness - indeed no history. Professor Rudiger 
Schott's famous inaugural lecture at the University of Munster 
6 on the "historical consciousness of peoples without written 
records" helped in assisting a quite different perspective to 
gain scholarly currency. In the meantime, the concept of "oral 
history" has dissolved the nexus between writing and history. 
Historical consciousness has become an anthropological 
universal. The cultural anthropologist E. Rothacker 
commented along these lines as early as 1931, saying that he 
viewed "historical consciousness" and a "historical sense" as a 
veritable primal human drive "to preserve events and figures 
from the past, remember and narrate."3 Schott notes that 
"historical sense is an elementary human quality, bound up 
with man's being as a cultural animal." Schott anchored this 
"primal drive" in functionally concrete realities, and was able 
to demonstrate that "oral historical traditions, even more than 
written accounts, are closely linked to the groups on whose 
fate they report." They are not only connected with these 
groups, but themselves exert a binding power. They are the 
most binding social glue since they narrate events upon which 
the group "bases the consciousness of its unity and 
uniqueness."4 • • 
This is undoubtedly correct - so much so in fact that there 
is no need today to accentuate its significance. A more 
intriguing question nowadays queries the differential relative 
strength of this human "primal drive": why is it so much 
more highly developed in some societies than in others?5 In 
addition, some societies appear not only to have developed 
this supposed "drive" to a far lesser degree than others, but 
attempt to work against it. For this reason, I tend to doubt 
that any such thing that might be termed a "historical sense" 
actually exists. 
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Rather , I would p re fe r to proceed f r o m the assumption, 
taking my cue f r o m Nietzsche, that h u m a n beings have a basic 
and natural tendency to forget r a ther than to engage in 
r emembrance . Seen f r o m that perspective, the p rob lem worth 
explaining is actually a qui te d i f ferent one : namely why should 
there be any interest in the past, its investigation a n d 
systematic t reatment? Instead of resort ing to the postulat ion of 
any special sense or drive, I think it is m o r e mean ingfu l to 
pose a quest ion in each individual instance: what was it that 7 
motivated h u m a n beings he re to start delving in to their past 
and do ing someth ing with it? I would like to p ropose the 
thesis that this interest in the past, down to a relatively late 
per iod, was no t any genera l "his tor ica l" interest, bu t was 
gu ided by o ther motives: namely a specific interest in 
legitimation, justification, reconciliation and change . In this 
sense, it is possible to inquire into the " incent ives" (Inzentive) 
and "quiet ives" (Quietive) of historical memory - i.e., its 
tr iggering and imped ing factors. 
Ancient Egyptian cul ture lends itself to such an app roach in 
a part icular degree . T h a t was a society whose past was p resen t 
to it in monumenta l ly impressive fo rm, a past it had surveyed 
with the aid of annals and lists of kings. Yet this was a past it 
was at a virtual loss to " d o " anything with. 
D o c u m e n t a t i o n - Incent ive or " Q u i e t i v e " o f M e m o r y ? 
It is an evident hypothesis that the Egyptians, as the people 
with the longest memory (next to the Sumerians) o n the basis 
of their unb roken tradit ion ex tend ing back over several 
mil lennia, developed a historical consciousness which was 
especially di f ferent ia ted and p r o n o u n c e d . Here , if anywhere, 
one expects to encoun te r an a b o u n d i n g interest in the past, 
an a b u n d a n c e of narratives deal ing with the grea t kings of the 
early era, p resent for all to see in their m o n u m e n t s , pe rhaps 
epic tales about the great accompl ishments of the founde r s of 
the polity, stories abou t wars, technical feats of engineer ing , 
etc. But no th ing of the like is conta ined in the sources. Much 
of this type can be f o u n d in Herodo tus , a n d was there fore 
alive in the oral history of the later per iod . Yet the official 
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sources do something quite different with history: the king-lists 
and annals show themselves to be a quietive, not an incentive 
for historiography. 
This topos of the people with the longest memory goes back 
to Herodotus. He reckons the length of this memory at 341 
generations, according to his calculations amounting to 11,340 
years. Documented history in Egypt is supposed to extend that 
far back in time. Herodotus writes: 
The sun, however, had within this period of time, on 
four several occasions, moved from his wonted course, 
twice rising where he now sets, and twice setting where 
he now rises. Egypt was in no degree affected by these 
changes; the productions of the land, and of the river, 
remained the same; nor was there anything unusual 
either in the diseases or the deaths." 
I do not wish to deal here with Herodotus' abstruse 
astronomy.7 What is more interesting is his conclusion. What 
do the Egyptians derive from their well-documented 
retrospective glance into history? A major insight: namely that 
nothing has changed. And it is to demonstrate this that one 
has the king-lists, annals and other documents." They do not 
prove the significant importance of history, but rather its 
triviality. The king-lists open up the past, but do not invite 
one to deal with that past. By documenting it, they withdraw it 
from the realm of imagination. 
Only when one deals with the gods does history become 
interesting. But that is where it ceases to be history in our 
sense, and becomes mythology. The time of the gods is the 
time of the great events, the time of change from which the 
world as we have known it for 12,000 years emerged. That is a 
period that can be narrated about because there is indeed 
something worth telling. We call these tales myths. They deal 
with the way the world has become what it is, as well as the 
mechanisms, rites and institutions which are there to make 
sure that world does not disappear again, and which thus 
protect that world from any further change and discontinuity. 
We can therefore come to the following general conclusion: 
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the ent i re intensive occupat ion with the past ref lected in 
anc ient Near Eastern t ime-reckoning, annals and king-lists 
serves to shut off history and e n h a n c e its desemiotization. 
In the meanwhile, we have learned enough abou t the 
Egyptian and Mesopotamian documen ta t ion media to be able 
to state with some certainty that we are no t deal ing in these 
cases with anything that might be called " in terna l ized 
history." Memory in the sense of internalized past relates to 
mythical, no t historical, t ime - because mythical time is a t ime 9 
of becoming, while historical t ime is seen as the cont inua t ion 
of what has already become . As such, it corresponds totally to 
the "e te rna l p r e s e n t " of totalitarian regimes as depic ted by 
Orwell.9 Internalized, o r m o r e precisely er-innerte, past finds its 
p rope r fo rm in narrative. This tale has a funct ion: e i ther it 
becomes the " e n g i n e of deve lopmen t , " to use Levi-Strauss's 
term,10 or it furnishes the basis for continuity. Yet in n o case is 
the past r e m e m b e r e d " f o r its own sake." 
O n e such example is the story of the fall of the fortress of 
Masada." In m o d e r n Israel, that story has taken o n the 
func t ion of a f o u n d i n g story. T h e ruins of Masada were no t 
only uncovered according to the rules of archaeological art , 
bu t were t rans formed into a nat ional shrine, where the 
recruits to the Israeli army must swear their allegiance. T h e 
story has been h a n d e d down by Josephus in Book 7 of The 
Jewish War. Its interest does no t lie in the objectivity of the 
presentat ion or its archaeological verification, but ra ther in the 
g round ing func t ion it serves. T h e concep t " f o u n d i n g story" 
refers to a kind of func t ion . What mat ters is how it is fulfilled. 
T h e r e is a truly f u n d a m e n t a l d i f fe rence whether a f o u n d i n g 
story takes place in illo tempore, f r o m which the advancing 
present does no t dis tance itself, and which is r e n d e r e d 
presence, actualized again and again in rites and festivals, o r 
whe ther that story occurs in historical time, and thus is at a 
measurable and growing remove f r o m the present . In the 
latter case, it can only be r e m e m b e r e d in rites and festivals, 
bu t no t r ende red actualized as a presence.1 2 
T h e fact that the exodus and the conques t of the promised 
land fo rm the f o u n d i n g story of anc ien t Israel does no t yet 
make them into myths in the sense of r ecu r ren t events in the 
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world of the gods, as Eliade has described.13 Israel's move 
consists in changing the function of the "founding story": 
where the neighboring cultures ground themselves on cosmic 
myths, Israel introduces a historical myth, thus "internalizing" 
its "historical becoming." And here it is undoubtedly 
appropriate to continue the thought by citing the Levi-
Straussian concept: namely, this was done in order to make 
that historical myth into an engine of Israel's development. 
10 Myth is past that has been condensed into founding story. 
Semio t i za t ion o f His tory in the C o n t e x t o f Gui l t 
Along with annals and king-lists as instruments of 
chronological control and orientation, classifiable as the media 
of a specific "cold" brand of memory,14 other genres develop 
in the ancient Near East (first in Mesopotamia, later in Egypt) 
which are categorizable as "historical texts," though not as 
historiography. I am referring here to the res gestae 
(Tatenberichte) of rulers in Mesopotamia, the so-called royal 
novellas {Konigsnovelleri) and other royal inscriptions in Egypt. 
Common to them is the feature that they do not reach back 
into the past, but rather wish to preserve contemporary events 
for future memory. In Mesopotamia, there is also an 
abundance of additional genres such as names, pseudo-stelae, 
letters of gods, building inscriptions - and these exceed by far 
anything similar produced in Egypt. The difference between 
these two cultures in regard to the experience and recording 
of history is that Mesopotamia possessed a culture of 
divination, while Egypt did not. We will deal below with the 
consequences flowing from this fact for our investigation here. 
Let it suffice to refer to the immediately evident connection 
between divination and semiosis. In any event, Mesopotamia 
leads the way/~in regard to the forms of dealing with history 
and the first beginnings of a kind of historiography. Yet these 
are no more than first beginnings. 
A dramatic turning-point can be found in the second half of 
the second millennium, i.e., the Late Bronze Age. Texts 
become richer, reach back further into the past, narrate in a 
more exact manner and construe more extensive and 
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embracing connections. The Hittite texts are the highpoint of 
this development, in particular, three works written in close 
temporal proximity: the Deeds of Suppiluliumas, the Ten-Year 
Annals and the Detailed Annals of Mursilis. In these works, 
composed ca. 1320 B.C.E., Mursilis gives an account not only 
of his own reign, but that of his father Suppiluliumas as well. 
This is unique, and especially important for our considerations 
because here, for the first time, the past is made into an 
object for the writing of history.15 This text also represents the 
apex of Hittite historical writing; within the text itself, Tablet 
7 constitutes the unmistakable climactic passage: 
While my father was down in the country of Karkamis, 
he dispatched Lupakkis and Tessub-zalmas to the 
country of Amqa. They proceeded to attack the country 
of Amqa and brought deportees, cattle (and) sheep 
before my father. When the people of the land of Egypt 
heard about the attack on Amqa, they became 
frightened. Because, to make matters worse, their lord 
Bibhururiyas had just died, the Egyptian queen who had 
become a widow, sent an envoy to my father and wrote 
him as follows: "My husband died and I have no son. 
People say that you have many sons. If you were to send 
me one of your sons, he might become my husband. I 
am loath to take a servant of mine and make him my 
husband." When my father heard that, he called the 
great into council (saying): "Since of old such a thing 
has never happened before me." He proceeded to 
dispatch Hattu-zitis, the chamberlain, (saying): "Go! 
Bring you reliable information back to me. They may try 
to deceive me: As to whether perhaps they have a 
prince bring reliable information back to me!" 
During Hattu-zitis' absence in the land of Egypt my 
father vanquished the city of Karkamis.... 
The Egyptian envoy, the Honorable Hanis, came to 
him. Because my father had instructed Hattu-zitis while 
sending him to the land of Egypt as follows: "Perhaps 
they have a prince; they may try to deceive me and do 
not really want one of my sons to (take over) the 
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kingship," the Egyptian queen answered my father in a 
letter as follows: "Why do you say: 'They may try to 
deceive me'? If I had a son, would I write to a foreign 
country in a manner which is humiliating to myself and 
to my country? You do not trust me and tell me even 
such a thing. He who was my husband died and I have 
no sons. Shall I perhaps take one of my servants and 
make him my husband? I have not written to any other 
12 country, I have written (only) to you. People say that 
you have many sons. Give me one of your sons and he 
is my husband and king in the land of Egypt." 
[The following section is badly mutilated. Suppiluliumas 
is upset by the emphatic tone with which the Egyptian 
side has virtually demanded a son from him. In 
addition, he expresses his doubts that the Egyptians 
might misuse his son as a hostage, discussing this with 
the Egyptian envoy, who is able to put his mind at rest.] 
And so my father, at their request, concerned himself 
with the question of a son. Then my father demanded 
the text of the treaty "how in earlier times the Storm-
god took the man of Kurustama, the Hittite, and 
brought him to the land of Egypt and made them (the 
people of Kurustama) into Egyptians; and how the 
Storm-god concluded a treaty between Egypt and the 
country of Hatti; how they were bound together in 
eternal friendship; and how the tablet was read in their 
presence." 
Then my father said the following words to them: 
"Hattusa and Egypt have been friendly for untold years. 
And now this thing has occurred between us too. The 
country of Hatti and the land of Egypt will in future 
continue to be eternally bound in friendship."16 
This is indeed a type of historical writing which is far 
superior in respect to richness of detail, color and nuance to 
anything similar known to us from ancient Egypt and the 
Near East. The long and complex concatenation of events 
presented here is particularly exceptional: Suppiluliumas stands 
before Karkamis; at the same time, he opens a secondary 
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theater of action, sending a troop unit under the leadership 
of two generals to Amka, in Egyptian territory; the Egyptians 
are seized by fear, especially since their king (Akhenaton) has 
just died; the Egyptian queen requests a Hittite prince as 
successor to the deceased Egyptian king; there are lengthy 
negotiations and inquiries, correspondence and sending of 
envoys. Apparently (a gap in the text at this point) the 
Egyptian envoys refer to an ancient treaty; the treaty with 
Egypt is consulted;17 on the basis of this treaty, Suppiluliumas 
ultimately gives his consent. 
Where is the Hitdte "incentive" for this peculiar interest in 
the past? The key to that lies in another text, likewise by 
Mursilis; it treats the identical events, but within the 
framework of another literary genre - i.e., in another 
funcdonal context. These are prayers to the Hittite Storm God 
whose purpose was to help put an end to a plague that had 
been raging for years in the country, and which was 
threatening the entire people. The oracles were consulted, and 
they referred to two ancient tablets. One dealt with sacrificial 
rites for the river Mala that had been neglected due to the 
plague. 
The second tablet concerned Kurustama. When the 
Hattian Storm-god had brought people of Kurustama to 
the country of Egypt and had made an agreement 
concerning them with the Hattians so that they were 
under oath to the Hattian Storm-god - although the 
Hattians as well as the Egyptians were under oath to the 
Hattian Storm-god, the Hattians ignored their 
obligations; the Hattians promptly broke the oath of the 
gods. My father sent foot soldiers and charioteers who 
attacked the country of Amka, Egyptian territory. Again 
he sent troops, and again they attacked it. When the 
Egyptians became frightened, they asked outright for 
one of his sons to (take over) the kingship. But when 
my father gave them one of his sons, they killed him as 
they led him there. My father let his anger run away 
with him, he went to war against Egypt and attacked 
Egypt. He smote the foot soldiers and the charioteers of 
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the country of Egypt- The Hattian Storm-god, my lord, 
by his decision even then let my father prevail; he 
vanquished and smote the foot soldiers and the 
charioteers of the country of Egypt. But when they 
brought back to the Hatti land the prisoners which they 
had taken a plague broke out among the prisoners and 
they began to die.18 
14 In this text, the concatenation of events is presented and 
supplemented by the final, tragic components: the king 
dispatches the prince, who is murdered during the journey; 
Suppiluliumas launches the war against Egypt and wins a 
battle; the Egyptian prisoners bring the plague to Hatti. It has 
raged for 20 years, claiming as victims a large part of the 
population, including the king himself, his son and successor 
Arnuwandas. The chain of events is also supplemented by a 
decisive link, reaching far back into the past. Who knows 
when the treaty was concluded between Egypt and Hatti 
regarding the people of Kurustama? The chain begins with 
this treaty: an oath was sworn here, later broken with the 
attack on Amka. 
The "incentive" of remembering involved is suffering and 
guilt. This linear reconstruction of history was not motivated 
by the spectacular event of the Egyptian offer of marriage, but 
rather by a 20-year plague - the plague and the conviction 
that well-doing and well-being {Tun and Ergehen) are 
interconnected, and that disaster is due to guilt. The nexus 
between sin and sanction lies in the hands of the gods, who 
reward good deeds and punish bad.1" 
Since guilt must be uncovered, made known and publicly 
confessed, it becomes an incentive for memory and self-
thematization. This idea probably first surfaced in 
Mesopotamia, and then spread through the ancient Near East 
and Egypt to Rome. Yet it is significant that the notion sunk 
particularly deep roots in Asia minor, the land of the 
Hittites.2" Within this horizon, suffering is basically interpreted 
as a punishment; this can be healed by expiation of the angry 
divinity and a public confession of guilt. 
Guilt and Remembrance 
Guilt is only one incentive, t hough an especially powerful 
one , which leads to Erinnerungsarbeit, reconstruct ion of the 
past, self-thematization and the writing of history. This 
incentive derives f r o m the exper ience of suffering. T h e 
exper ience of suffer ing excludes two premises: the premise of 
meaningless accidentality, and the premise of cyclic 
recurrence . Suffer ing is (a) a sign and (b) an except ion. 
Consequently, the semiotization of suffer ing shatters the 
cyclicality of time and history. 
Events are demons t ra t ions of divine power. But they are no t 
always punitive, bu t also redemptive. T h e latter are ju s t as 
memorab le and d e m a n d i n g of confession. This also genera tes 
a rich l i terature of public self-thematization. O n e example is 
the "apology" of Hattusilis III. It reconstructs past happen ings 
as a demonst ra t ion of the power of the divinity like the 
plague prayers of Mursilis; yet they are no t con ta ined within a 
f ramework of anger and pun i shmen t , but ra ther of grace and 
blessing. T h e repor t by Hattusilis can be best classified as a 
kind of "are tology." This term designates a tale of w o n d e r 
that glorifies a redempt ive or punitive demons t ra t ion of power 
by the divinity. In Egypt, this gen re is called "p roc lamat ion of 
demonstra t ions of power" (Egyptian: sdd b3w). Such texts can 
be f o u n d in the t ime of the Ramessides in Egypt, bo th in 
royal and private inscriptions - i.e., in the same epoch du r ing 
which Mursilis II and Hattusilis III re igned in Hatti . 
In Egypt, there were f r o m an early per iod two distinct and 
mutually exclusive fo rms of m o n u m e n t a l self-thematization: the 
royal repor t on deeds and the autobiographical t omb 
inscription. Jus t as private persons never make single deeds 
the object of a m o n u m e n t a l self-thematization, kings never 
give a comprehensive account of their ent i re life. This 
traditional d ichotomy unde rwen t a decisive change a r o u n d 
1300 B.C.E. At this time, inscriptions begin to occur in 
which private individuals repor t , no t on their whole lives, bu t 
on a single episode that they in te rpre t as divine intervent ion. 
This intervention makes the episode mean ingfu l and worth 
recording; it also separates it ou t f r o m the rest of the life 
process as a special unit . 
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Among royal inscriptions, there are no such stelae attested, 
and a text such as the plague prayers of Mursilis, in which a 
king proclaims the guilt of his father and atones for it, is 
probably inconceivable in ancient Egypt. What do exist are 
royal inscriptions in which the original form of res gestae turns 
into a report on experienced divine aid, and stelae with 
prayers to the deity. These texts utilize the same vocabulary as 
private inscriptions, express the same attitude toward the deity 
16 and demonstrate that this phenomenon reflects a 
thoroughgoing change in the history of mentality and must 
not be reduced to popular piety.21 The most impressive 
example for the reports on deeds are the documentation by 
Ramses II on the Qadesh battle;22 for the prayers, the best 
example is the hymn of Ramses III to Amun.2 ! 
As is well-known, Ramses II was caught in a Hittite ambush 
in the battle at Qadesh. While part of his troops were still on 
the way and part of them were fleeing, he was entangled with 
a few faithful followers in an apparently hopeless defensive 
battle against a Hittite force that had, surprisingly, launched 
an attack. By happy coincidence, an elite unit with a special 
assignment moving along another route arrived just in time to 
liberate him. A map-like presentation attempts to depict the 
course of this battle in all essential details, and contains long 
supplementary text passages. In respect to fidelity of detail, 
this documentation exceeds by far the traditional genre. In 
addition, Ramses had an epic text added, the size of an entire 
book (by Egyptian standards), in which he proclaimed his 
happy rescue to be divine intervention. The text culminates in 
a prayer spoken by Ramses in great distress to Amun, and 
Amun hears the prayer: 
I call to you, my father Amun, 
here in the midst of the crowd that I know not. 
All foreigners have united against me, 
while I am alone, no one is with me. 
I found Amun had come after I called him. 
He gave me his hand, and I rejoiced. 
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"I called to god" - "I found that he had come" - this is 
precisely the scheme in the private stelae; 
I called to my mistress, 
and found she had come in a sweet breath of air.24 
The notion of "coming" is the expression for the nearness 
of god experienced (and "found") in a wondrous rescue, a 
change for the good. One could explore these parallels 
between private inscriptions and royal inscriptions much 
further. My interest here is to underscore one fact alone: 
namely, that no difference is made in them between the 
biography of an individual in which god intervenes in a 
wondrous manner, and grand history, where kings, battles and 
the fate of entire peoples are involved and where god 
intervenes in exactly the same form. Both biographical and 
political history become fields of divine intervention. 
Theologization of History in the Context of 
"Connective Justice" 
When human fate and political history become fields for 
divine intervention, they change their structure. I would like 
to describe this structural change using the concept of event. 
The historical event is the opposite of the mythical event. The 
distinguishing feature is its singularity. The mythical event is a 
basic pattern that recurs in the infinite repetition of rites and 
feasts. The historical event has an actual site, a locus in time 
and place, and cannot be repeated. The mythical event, by its 
cyclical repetition, structures or "ornamentalizes" time by the 
infinite symmetry of its return.2'' The historical event structures 
time by breaking into its natural cyclicality and dividing it into 
a before and after. The mythical event "cyclicizes" time, the 
historical event linearizes it. The mythical event has to be 
celebrated, enacted, actualized. The historical event, which is 
already actualized, must be published, eternalized, 
commemorated, remembered. For that reason, only the 
historical event becomes an incendve for remembering, 
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historical consciousness, historiography - not the mythical 
event. 
The theologization of history begins initially with the 
historical event. The incursion of the divine into the sphere of 
human action and experience is not experienced as a 
continuity in the sphere of biocosmic nature, but rather as 
discontinuity.* However, there are significant differences 
between divine intervention and sacred history. Three 
conceptions can be distinguished here: 
1. The redemptive event, produced by divine intervention, as 
the deity intervenes in the flow of happenings. The stream of 
eventuality bifurcates here into the trivial, desemiotized 
background of regularity and the semiotized foreground of 
exceptions, events, though no distinction is made between 
"historical" and "natural" events. 
2. The history of salvation, produced by the covenant entered 
into by a people with a deity. The entire "stream of events" 
becomes readable, decipherable as the history of this 
covenant. Everything a people experiences is associated with its 
loyalty or lack of loyalty toward the divine partner. The 
decisive category here is not the "plan," but rather the 
mutual self-obligation of the partners to the alliance, the 
covenant. 
3. Time and history, conceived as the sole emanation of the 
planning will of a deity, encompassing both regularity and 
exceptionality. 
For the Mesopotamian world, variant 1 is typical. This is 
derived from the ancient and deeply rooted, highly elaborated 
practice of divination. It spread together with cuneiform script 
to the west, as far as Asia Minor, and then with the Etruscans 
all the way to Rome.27 Divination presupposes that the events 
derive from divine will, and thus can be provoked or 
prevented by exercising influence on this will. 
Egypt presents us with the opposite of a culture of 
divination. Here the will of the gods is bound up with 
maintenance of the world, and thus with regularity and its 
recurrence. The concept of "what is happening" (in the sense 
of distinct events) has a negative value and tends to be 
associated with disorder, senselessness and misfortune.'8 In 
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p l a c e o f d i v i n a t i o n , t h e E g y p t i a n s h a d m a g i c - i .e . , r i t e s w h i c h 
t h e c r e a t o r g a v e t h e m " i n o r d e r t o w a r d o f f t h e b l o w o f 
events ." 2 1 1 T o s u m m a r i z e t h e d i f f e r e n c e in a b r i e f f o r m u l a 
w h i c h is a n o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e 
h i s t o r i c a l var ie ty : E g y p t s e m i o t i z e s t h e r u l e , M e s o p o t a m i a , i n 
c o n t r a s t , t h e e x c e p t i o n . 
I n t h e N e w K i n g d o m , h o w e v e r , a t h e o l o g y o f t h e will a l so 
d e v e l o p s i n Egyp t , l e a d i n g t o a t h e o l o g i z a t i o n o f h is tory . 3 0 
H a p p e n i n g s a r e n o l o n g e r p e r c e i v e d as t h e i n t r u s i o n o f c h a o s , 
w h i c h m u s t b e c o u n t e r e d by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f r i t e s , b u t 
r a t h e r a r e v i e w e d b o t h as d i v i n e i n t e r v e n t i o n ( in t h e s e n s e o f 
v a r i a n t 1 ) , as wel l as - o n t h e h i g h level o f e x p l i c i t t h e o l o g y -
a n e m a n a t i o n o f t h e d i v i n e will o f c r e a t i o n . T h a t will n o t o n l y 
b r i n g s f o r t h t i m e , b u t a l so w h a t e v e r t a k e s p l a c e in time: " Y o u r 
will (ka) is all t h a t is h a p p e n i n g . " 3 1 T h e to ta l i ty o f al l 
h a p p e n i n g s s p r i n g i n g f r o m t h e p l a n n i n g will o f t h i s g o d ( in 
t h e s e n s e o f v a r i a n t 3) is d i v i d e d i n t o g o o d a n d b a d 
o c c u r r e n c e s , a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r t h e y s p r i n g f r o m g o d ' s 
g r a c e ( E g y p t i a n : hzwt) o r h i s a n g e r (b3w). N a t u r a l l y , g r a c e a n d 
a n g e r a r e n o t l e f t fu l ly t o t h e ' a r b i t r a r y will o f t h e de i ty ; 
o t h e r w i s e , m a n c o u l d i n c u r n o gu i l t . R a t h e r , t h e c o n c e p t o f 
g u i l t p r e s u p p o s e s a k i n d o f law a n d j u s t i c e , w h i c h m a n h a s 
v i o l a t e d , t h u s p r o v o k i n g d i v i n e w r a t h . W e will d e a l w i t h t h a t i n 
g r e a t e r d e t a i l b e l o w . 
A s e c o n d s t a g e in t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f h i s t o r y is r e a c h e d 
w h e n t h e p a s t is w o r k e d t h r o u g h sys t ema t i ca l ly f r o m t h e 
s t a n d p o i n t o f g u i l t - w h e n g e n u i n e " h i s t o r i c a l w o r k s " c o m e 
i n t o b e i n g t h a t j u d g e p a s t p e r i o d s o f r u l e a c c o r d i n g to t h e 
g o o d c o n d u c t o f t h e k i n g a n d t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e p e o p l e . 
T h e o l d e s t t e x t in w h i c h t h e p a s t h a s b e e n p r o c e s s e d in a 
t h e o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f g u i l t is t h e so-
c a l l e d W e i d n e r C h r o n i c l e f r o m t h e N e w B a b y l o n i a n p e r i o d . I n 
th i s c h r o n i c l e r e a c h i n g f a r b a c k i n t o t h e p a s t , t h e s u c c e s s o f 
t h e k i n g s as r u l e r s is a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e way t h e y b e h a v e d 
t o w a r d t h e Esag i la , t h e M a r d u k t e m p l e in Baby lon . 3 2 I n v a r i o u s 
cases , t h e t r a n s i t i o n o f roya l r u l e f r o m o n e d y n a s t y t o t h e n e x t 
is j u s t i f i e d by a g u i l t t h a t t h e r u l e r s h a v e i n c u r r e d , a n d t h e 
d e c l i n e o f t h e e m p i r e o f U r is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v i o l a t i o n s a n d 
t r a n s g r e s s i o n s c o m m i t t e d by K i n g Sulgi . 3 3 T h e i d e a o f g u i l t 
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renders the past meaningful, provides a consecutiveness to the 
sequence of kings and their reigns. What it makes visible and 
explicates is break, change and shift. Only in this form does 
the past become significant, memorable and related to the 
future. 
The historical work of Deuteronomy elevates the question 
regarding the faithfulness of the rulers to the law to the rank 
of a guiding perspective. Here too, what is involved is a 
20 history of guilt. Yet it is not written in order to legitimate a 
new dynasty that has returned to faithful adherence to the law 
and regained God's blessing. Rather, the focus here is on 
understanding the catastrophic events of the present as still 
being God's acting in the world - and the ability to cope with 
those events.''4 Under the criterion of guilt, the sequence of 
events is ordered into a history that inexorably leads to the 
disaster. History as narrated in the Book of Kings is generated 
by guilt, and guilt is generated by the law. The law, codified 
in the Torah, is the will of God, revealed once and for all 
time; his revelation has rendered all divination and reading of 
"signs" a superfluous art. 
Periodic reading aloud of the law serves to promote the 
memory of the text of the treaty. Even profane state treaties 
require a regular reading before the vassal." In connection 
with this custom, a public reading of the Torah is set in 
Deuteronomy for every seven years (Deut. 31:9ff.). Ezra, 
during Tabernacles, read the people the Torah day after day, 
from the first to the final day of the festival (Neh. 8:1 and 
18).,6 The practice of synagogal reading of the Torah evolves 
from this, in which the entire Torah is read once completely 
during the cycle of the year. The verbal divine service of the 
Christian churches likewise follows in the wake of a legal 
institution which was conceived as an organ of collective 
memory. A part of this memory is the recapitulation of a 
common shared history: the sacred deeds of the Lord and the 
transgressions of the people. The horizon of such history is no 
longer that of the event, of intervention, but rather of sacred 
history." 
The meaning of events presents itself to man as a nexus of 
conduct and fate, Tun and Ergehen. This nexus is usually 
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t e r m e d causa l i ty . Yet t h a t is i n c o r r e c t , o r a t t h e very leas t , is 
h i g h l y r e d u c t i o n i s t . T h e c o n c e p t o f causa l i t y s u g g e s t s t h e i d e a 
o f a n a u t o m a t i s m in n a t u r a l law in t h e l i n k i n g o f e v e n t s . B u t 
it is p r e c i s e l y t h a t n o t i o n w h i c h is t h e o p p o s i t e o f t h e 
c o n c e p t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h e a n c i e n t t ex t s . R a t h e r , s u c h t e x t s 
r e c k o n w i t h p o w e r s , a u t h o r i t i e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w a t c h 
o v e r t h e n e x u s b e t w e e n a c t i o n a n d s u c c e s s - i .e. , t h a t m a k e 
s u r e t h a t g o o d is r e w a r d e d a n d evil a v e n g e d . I n all cases , w h a t 
is i n v o l v e d is r e t r i b u t i o n , n o t causality. '1 8 O n l y t h e f u n c t i o n i n g 
o f t h i s r e t r i b u t i o n is i m a g i n e d i n d i f f e r i n g ways. 
I n s t e a d o f s p e a k i n g a b o u t r e t r i b u t i o n , t h e s o u r c e s ta lk a b o u t 
j u s t i c e . 3 9 J u s t i c e is t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t u n i t i n g t h e s p h e r e s o f 
law, r e l i g i o n a n d m o r a l i t y . J u s t i c e g u i d e s t h e j u d g m e n t o f 
j u d g e s , t h e a c t i o n o f k ings ; it g u i d e s m e n d o w n t h e i r p a t h s 
a n d is t h e p r i n c i p l e b i n d i n g t h e r e s u l t t o t h e d e e d . S e n s e a n d 
j u s t i c e a r e t h u s o n e a n d t h e s a m e . I n a j u s t w o r l d , g o o d is 
r e w a r d e d a n d evil a v e n g e d . T h i s is t h e c o r e o f a n c i e n t N e a r 
E a s t e r n w i s d o m , w h i c h is p r i n c i p a l l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h 
p r e v e n t i n g h u m a n b e i n g s f r o m a v e n g i n g t h e m s e l v e s a n d 
s t r iv ing f o r p r i v a t e h a p p i n e s s o n t h e bas i s o f t h e i r o w n 
s t r e n g t h a n d will . T h e c o n c e p t o f " c o n n e c t i v e " j u s t i c e , i .e , a 
b i n d i n g a n d l i n k i n g n o t i o n o f j u s t i c e , w o u l d a p p e a r t o b e 
a p p r o p r i a t e f r o m a n u m b e r o f p e r s p e c t i v e s : 
1. J u s t i c e b i n d s h u m a n b e i n g s t o g e t h e r , c r e a t e s t h e bas i s f o r 
soc ia l c o h e s i o n a n d so l ida r i ty . 
2. J u s t i c e l inks s u c c e s s t o t h e d e e d , p u n i s h m e n t t o c r i m e , a n d 
t h u s h e l p s t o f u r n i s h s e n s e , m e a n i n g a n d c o h e r e n c e , 
" c o n n e c t i o n " in a n o t h e r w i s e a c c i d e n t a l , u n c o n n e c t e d s t r e a m 
of e v e n t s . 
B o t h d i m e n s i o n s , t h e soc ia l (1) a n d t h e t e m p o r a l ( 2 ) , a r e 
e n c o m p a s s e d by t h e c o n c e p t o f " b i n d i n g n e s s " (Ver-bindlichkeit). 
H e r e it is a q u e s t i o n o f b o t h t h e soc ia l as we l l as t h e t e m p o r a l 
h o r i z o n o f t h e va l id i ty o f l ega l n o r m s . A b i n d i n g n o r m b i n d s 
h u m a n b e i n g s , b i n d s time - by p l a c i n g its c l a i m to va l id i ty in 
a l i m i t e d o r u n l i m i t e d f u t u r e . 
I n so d o i n g , j u s t i c e c r e a t e s a memory-space, o n e i n w h i c h w h a t 
is va l id t o d a y is w h a t was va l id y e s t e r d a y , a n d w h e r e 
t o m o r r o w ' s va l id i ty will b e a n e x t e n s i o n o f t o d a y ' s . O n e law 
p r e d o m i n a t e s in th i s s p a c e , t h e c o m m a n d m e n t : " T h o u s h a l t 
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not forget!" This is the strongest and most original incentive 
for memory. 
Such "connective" justice can be imagined in three ways: 
1. The most simple and widespread conception of a nexus 
between doing and faring {Tun and Ergehen) is represented by 
the conviction that good is its "own reward" and evil 
"avenges itself." This principle of an "immanent 
providence"40 presupposes neither divine nor state 
22 intervention, and is based on the daily experiences of 
functioning while living in society. Involved here is the idea of 
a self-regulative circulation of good and evil, which finds its 
most abstract expression in the "golden rule,"41 though also 
in the more concrete casuistry of proverbial wisdom ("Lying 
will get you nowhere," etc.). 
This simple wisdom is specified in two different ways in Near 
Eastern high cultures: 
2. Political justice leaves the functioning of the connection 
between doing and faring to the state. Classic examples for 
this interpretation of reality are offered by Egypt and India. 
According to this conception, chaos erupts when the state 
collapses. Sense and order vanish from the world. Good is no 
longer rewarded, evil is no longer avenged, the big fish eat 
the small, and the sons slay their fathers. 
3. Religious justice leaves the functioning of the connection 
between conduct/faring to the reign and control of the gods. 
Reward and punishment are no longer conceived in the sense 
of self-regulation as consequences of action itself, which is 
"rewarding" or avenges itself, but are rather conceptualized as 
the results of divine intervention. This presupposes the context 
of a "theology of the will," which attributes to the gods an 
intentionality oriented toward earthly-human fate. 
Not until it took on this form did the theory of "connective 
justice" function as an incentive for memory. Divine justice 
and its corresponding teaching of human responsibility imbue 
what is happening with a meaning whose knowledge is all-
important. This process can be termed "semiotization by 
theologization." 
The land of origin of this "theology of the will" is 
Mesopotamia.12 Here one encounters by far the earliest texts 
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relating events back to the will of the gods. Albrektson has 
been able to conclusively demonstrate that planned action and 
an intentional intervention in human-earthly matters is at least 
as typical of Mesopotamian gods as of the image of God in 
the Hebrew scriptures. What Albrektson failed to note was that 
most of the texts he cites are juridical in nature: treaties, in 
which the potential transgressors are handed over to divine 
retribution. 
These "curse formulae" express most clearly what can be 
expected of the gods: namely the guaranteeing of connective 
justice. The future into which these texts project and exercise 
their binding power lies in the hands of the gods; it is they 
who must make sure that the laws are not forgotten and that 
the transgressor is punished. The oldest text of this sort is a 
boundary stela between Lagash and Ummu. The transgressor 
is threatened with destruction at the hands of Enlil and 
Ningirsu, and it is stated that this will occur as political 
misfortune: his people will deny him obedience and kill him. 
The law constitutes a sphere of norm-bound action to which 
the ruler is also subject. Just as his subjects are under his 
control, he himself is subject to the control of the gods. 
Calamity is visited upon a king who violates the norms. 
Recollection of this calamity serves to inculcate those norms. 
This is the topic of the lamentation literature and the 
moralizing kings' legends (especially about Naramsin). The 
lamentation known by the name "curse on Akkad" narrates 
that King Naramsin destroyed the Enlil temple in Nippur and 
that Enlil then sent the Guteans to his country: 
He let them come from the distant mountains, 
those unlike any (otherwise known) people, those who 
are not counted among the peoples, 
the Guteans, who do not know obligations like a normal 
people, 
they have the form of human beings, but their words 
are like the voice of a dog, 
Enlil had them sent for from the mountains. 
They covered the earth in great hordes like locusts.*s 
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This non-documentary , highly poetic fo rm of record ing and 
narrat ion of history presupposes its in terpre ta t ion and 
semiotization. And this derives f r o m the principle of iustitia 
connectiva, the sphere of law protec ted by gods - a sphere 
linking p u n i s h m e n t to guilt, o r fo rmula ted in m o r e genera l 
terms: b inding consequences to deeds . 
T h e connect ion between guilt, law and justice is also striking 
in the great Hitt i te historical works. T h e classic offenses 
24 punished by divine penalty a re perjury, breaking of o n e ' s oath 
and breach of contract . This is especially clear in the 
Suppiluliumas affair. Here , af ter consult ing the oracle, two 
" table ts" with b ind ing ag reemen t s are made known, which 
were broken by Suppilul iumas. O n e concerns the sacrifices for 
the Mala river (Euphra tes) , the o the r and m u c h m o r e decisive 
o n e involves a treaty with Egypt. In regard to this treaty, 
Mursilis avers: 
[But] I did no t add a single wo[rd] 
to th[is] tablet, no r d id I de t rac t any." 
This formulaic claim, classified by H. Cancik as the earliest 
example of the so-called "l i teral f o r m u l a " ( "de t rac t a n d add 
no th ing" ) does no t r e fe r to the fai thful rendi t ion of the 
traditional text, bu t r a the r the " l i t e ra l" keeping of the treaty 
o r contract.45 Significantly, this fo rmula has exactly the same 
meaning in Deu te ronomy (4:2). Moreover, its p recursor in the 
epilogue of the Codex H a m m u r a b i does no t refer , as Cancik 
thinks, to the fidelity of documen ta ry tradit ion, bu t to the 
fidelity of keeping recognized obligations. In the Egyptian 
context as well, all d o c u m e n t e d examples of the fo rmula 
(previously to da te no t recognized as such) relate to the virtue 
of reliability. Officials boast that they " n e i t h e r add n o r detract 
anyth ing" (Egyptian: jnj jtj, "b r ing , t ake") , and by this they 
are not refer r ing to the work of copying scribes, bu t r a the r to 
fidelity and reliability in carrying ou t orders and fulfilling 
obligations.4" 
What then does this special sacredness of oa ths and 
contracts consist in? T h e salient fea ture is that they are sworn 
in the presence of a god. This gives t hem their absolute 
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validity and inviolable binding quality. The gods are utilized to 
watch over these oaths and contracts, and make sure that they 
are kept. If the gods intervene punitively in the case of a 
breach of oath or contract, then they are intervening in 
matters in which they were specifically involved previously by 
human decision. Thus, gods are drawn by men into history. 
This is the other side of the coin of their intervention. 
This serves to demonstrate that the process of theologization 
of history that begins to spread in the second half of the 
second millennium throughout the entire Near East and the 
Mediterranean is directly associated with the diplomatic 
practice of the time. All smaller and larger states in the world 
at that time were increasingly entering into mutual contact -
and such contacts were largely regulated by treaty. This 
begins with the aforementioned boundary dike between Umma 
and Lagash, and expands over the course of a millennium, 
evolving into a network embracing the entire oikoumene of that 
era. All treaties must be sworn under oath, and gods must be 
included as protective powers of such oaths. 
The world of gods functions as an institution of 
"international law," assuring the keeping of treaties between 
peoples. At the basis of this is a high level of diplomatic art, 
that also has a theological dimension, since the world of gods 
of the participating countries must be intertranslatable. In this 
context, religious intolerance denying the other gods their 
existence would be inconceivable. 
To the degree that activity in foreign policy by the 
participant states subjects itself to the rules of the diplomatic 
order of mutual relations, the gods necessarily are drawn ever 
more centrally into history. In this system, the ruler who is 
most conscientious in keeping treaties is in the right, and the 
one who breaks treaties is in the wrong. Breach of treaty 
becomes the primal model of sin. 
Seen from this angle, it is understandable to just what a 
significant degree the theologization of history was intensified 
once a people came upon the notion not only of invoking its 
deity as a protective lord of a political alliance treaty, but of 
actually concluding such a treaty with the deity himself - as if 
that deity were the king of Egypt or Assyria.47 Two completely 
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new dimensions are created by such a move: the god as 
"lord" of history, and the "people" as that history's subject. 
Moreover, such a treaty cannot be concluded for a 
circumscribed period of limited time; it is evident that the 
time horizon involved here necessarily extends forward to the 
end of days and backward to the primal era of creation. It is 
within the framework of this new type of theocratic 
constellation that the concept of sacred history evolves. Iustitia 
26 connectiva becomes divine justice.48 
Mesopotamian historical interpretation is just as much a 
theodicy as its biblical counterpart. But it stands completely 
under the sign of the "event." The historical action of the 
gods is occasional in nature, and the unit of memory is the 
event. In the biblical tradition, the event gradually loses its 
contours and expands to become world history. In the 
Mesopotamian image of history, there is still an operative 
rhythm of salvation and disaster, grace and wrath. The biblical 
view of history sees profane history in ever more radical form 
as being an expression solely of (divine) anger, contrasting 
this with the one and final salvation, namely the kingdom of 
God, as a mode of anti-history.49 
In summary, history can be viewed, I would contend, as a 
function of iustitia connectiva. Only the constituting of that 
sphere of obligation and ties, which creates order, meaning 
and connection in the temporal and societal dimension, makes 
it possible to reconstruct the past - a reconstruction upon 
which memory and history are founded. 
What is remembered? - that which binds together and is 
binding, that which must not be forgotten. Remembering of 
the past does not follow any human drive or innate interest, 
but rather adheres to a duty which is a component of 
constructing human culture. Only the cultural construction of 
iustitia connectiva gives rise to the commemorative imperative 
"Thou shalt remember! Thou shalt not forget!" This 
imperative is then concretized as historical sense in individual 
cultures and human beings in a manner specific to them. 
Translated from the German by Bill Tempter 
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